I'm disturbed by the way you are framing Russell's quote as to be dividing knowledge into three domains, as though three equal branches of government. In fact, he is saying science is knowledge and religion is not; it is dogma. He was a lifelong atheist.
Russell is not saying theology produces knowledge of metaphysics. He is saying theology produces dogma about what lies beyond knowledge. That distinction is everything.
Russell’s actual epistemic hierarchy is that 1. Science is knowledge (fallible, but evidential). 2. Philosophy is provisional inquiry, conceptual clarification. 3. Theology is dogma, belief without evidence. Russell’s language is deliberately disparaging toward theology. He is not granting it a legitimate metaphysical method—he is cordoning it off!
This is perfectly consistent with Russell’s lifelong atheism and his hostility to metaphysical claims not grounded in logic or science.
Yes, you've captured Russell's take. Obviously mine is another. In keeping with this difference, I consider Russell's epistemology here to be a species of positivism, and my own alternative a post-positivism, which is what I developed in the chat. I disagree with nearly everything in your epistemology of philosophy, math, science, and theology -- nearly! -- but still you are more or less getting Russell right. Maybe I chose the wrong title. I didn't mean to introduce his positivism and leave it there. Rather, it's only a point of departure from which I develop my post-Russellian post-positivism.
This whole discussion reminds me of Jaegwon Kim's response to Quine's "Epistemology Naturalized" wherein Kim argues that Quine's proposal to replace traditional epistemology with empirical psychology would eliminate the field's necessary normative aspect.
I'm with you on being non-positivist (I can't say I'm a post-positivist because I was never a positivist nor was every philosopher from Carnap's day.) As I said, mathematics and logic are metaphysical and therefore knowledge that is not science. Are they philosophy? No. Philosophy of mathematics is philosophy.
In addition, there are other realms of knowledge which are none of the three Russell mentions. How about "know how" in every day situations? For example, the baker who knows how to cook a good cake. He may understand some of the science, some of the chemistry, involved in baking a cake, but could also have got the knowledge of cake baking from his mother who got it from hers. This is the generational and traditional method to knowledge you talk about above. Is this the same as science knowledge? No. His grandmother knew nothing of the science. She just knew how to bake a good cake. Science can never dictate whether a cake should be moist or sweet (good). (I know Russell has a response to this with his "optative," but I disagree and prefer Berlin's response.)
So why is cake baking a realm of knowledge and theology is not? After all Catholics serve wafers at mass (haha). I would agree that there is all kinds of knowledge in religious traditions--knowing when in mass to serve the wafer--which are not science knowledge. My point above was about theology--specifically the study of god.
No Man's Land makes philosophy sound marginal, the in-between ground of two warring sides. A contemporary British philosopher of Russell, Isaiah Berlin, proposed philosophy as the pioneering tradition. Philosophers come up with the new questions, and when these begin to be answered by science in a reliable way, it moves on.
Isn't mathematics and logic philosophy rather than science? Science is about the physical world and therefore always empirical. Mathematics is based on a set of metaphysical axioms. I believe that neither Plato nor Aristotle considered math a science, even though it serves as a tool for the sciences. (Physics is mostly math.)
There is also much philosophy "of" the sciences, i.e. philosophy of biology (which biologists follow regularly). I grant, the bulk of philosophy of biology is rather more recent than Russell.
I appreciate your attempt to parallelize theology with science because they both have traditions and methods. ("Science too must believe by tradition and faith.) However, the two are about very different domains of knowledge. Theology pursues knowledge of the supernatural which is beyond human knowledge. It is paradoxical and self defeating. Science, on the other hand, is the pursuit of knowledge of the natural world, and very much in our epistemological capacity. There have been theologians who considered themselves much like scientists in their approach, but no matter their tradition or method, they are in pursuit of the unattainable. Theologians' drive to frame morality must also be seen as pursuit of supernatural knowledge as, for them, morality exists because of god. Theo = god. The moment a theologian begins to pursue the natural world exclusive of the supernatural, she is no longer a theologian.
Note that I place mathematics and logic in the natural realm.
I'm disturbed by the way you are framing Russell's quote as to be dividing knowledge into three domains, as though three equal branches of government. In fact, he is saying science is knowledge and religion is not; it is dogma. He was a lifelong atheist.
Russell is not saying theology produces knowledge of metaphysics. He is saying theology produces dogma about what lies beyond knowledge. That distinction is everything.
Russell’s actual epistemic hierarchy is that 1. Science is knowledge (fallible, but evidential). 2. Philosophy is provisional inquiry, conceptual clarification. 3. Theology is dogma, belief without evidence. Russell’s language is deliberately disparaging toward theology. He is not granting it a legitimate metaphysical method—he is cordoning it off!
This is perfectly consistent with Russell’s lifelong atheism and his hostility to metaphysical claims not grounded in logic or science.
Yes, you've captured Russell's take. Obviously mine is another. In keeping with this difference, I consider Russell's epistemology here to be a species of positivism, and my own alternative a post-positivism, which is what I developed in the chat. I disagree with nearly everything in your epistemology of philosophy, math, science, and theology -- nearly! -- but still you are more or less getting Russell right. Maybe I chose the wrong title. I didn't mean to introduce his positivism and leave it there. Rather, it's only a point of departure from which I develop my post-Russellian post-positivism.
This whole discussion reminds me of Jaegwon Kim's response to Quine's "Epistemology Naturalized" wherein Kim argues that Quine's proposal to replace traditional epistemology with empirical psychology would eliminate the field's necessary normative aspect.
I'm with you on being non-positivist (I can't say I'm a post-positivist because I was never a positivist nor was every philosopher from Carnap's day.) As I said, mathematics and logic are metaphysical and therefore knowledge that is not science. Are they philosophy? No. Philosophy of mathematics is philosophy.
In addition, there are other realms of knowledge which are none of the three Russell mentions. How about "know how" in every day situations? For example, the baker who knows how to cook a good cake. He may understand some of the science, some of the chemistry, involved in baking a cake, but could also have got the knowledge of cake baking from his mother who got it from hers. This is the generational and traditional method to knowledge you talk about above. Is this the same as science knowledge? No. His grandmother knew nothing of the science. She just knew how to bake a good cake. Science can never dictate whether a cake should be moist or sweet (good). (I know Russell has a response to this with his "optative," but I disagree and prefer Berlin's response.)
So why is cake baking a realm of knowledge and theology is not? After all Catholics serve wafers at mass (haha). I would agree that there is all kinds of knowledge in religious traditions--knowing when in mass to serve the wafer--which are not science knowledge. My point above was about theology--specifically the study of god.
No Man's Land makes philosophy sound marginal, the in-between ground of two warring sides. A contemporary British philosopher of Russell, Isaiah Berlin, proposed philosophy as the pioneering tradition. Philosophers come up with the new questions, and when these begin to be answered by science in a reliable way, it moves on.
Isn't mathematics and logic philosophy rather than science? Science is about the physical world and therefore always empirical. Mathematics is based on a set of metaphysical axioms. I believe that neither Plato nor Aristotle considered math a science, even though it serves as a tool for the sciences. (Physics is mostly math.)
There is also much philosophy "of" the sciences, i.e. philosophy of biology (which biologists follow regularly). I grant, the bulk of philosophy of biology is rather more recent than Russell.
I appreciate your attempt to parallelize theology with science because they both have traditions and methods. ("Science too must believe by tradition and faith.) However, the two are about very different domains of knowledge. Theology pursues knowledge of the supernatural which is beyond human knowledge. It is paradoxical and self defeating. Science, on the other hand, is the pursuit of knowledge of the natural world, and very much in our epistemological capacity. There have been theologians who considered themselves much like scientists in their approach, but no matter their tradition or method, they are in pursuit of the unattainable. Theologians' drive to frame morality must also be seen as pursuit of supernatural knowledge as, for them, morality exists because of god. Theo = god. The moment a theologian begins to pursue the natural world exclusive of the supernatural, she is no longer a theologian.
Note that I place mathematics and logic in the natural realm.